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Abstract:  
To introduce new products and processes, firms often acquire knowledge from other organizations. 
Drawing on social capital and transaction cost theory, we argue that not only is the impact of such 
acquisitions on the successful development of product and product innovations dependent on 
strategic and economic variables, it may also be contingent on the “knowledge characteristics” of 
the geographical area in which the firm is located. Combining data on social capital at the level of 
21 regions with a large scale data set on innovative activities by a representative sample of 2464 
Italian manufacturing firms, we find — after controlling for a large set of firm and regional 
characteristics — that being located in regions characterized by high levels of social interaction 
leads to a higher propensity to innovate. In addition, being located in an area characterized by a 
high degree of social interaction positively moderates the effectiveness of externally acquired R&D 
on innovation inclination. 
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1. Introduction 
Although the importance of external sources — e.g., users, suppliers, competitors, universities etc. — for 
innovation is not new, up until recent years most firms have conducted research and development (R&D) 
activities predominantly in-house. Recently, however, in a large number of industrial sectors, purchases 
of technology licenses and outsourcing of R&D processes have increased, reflecting the emergence of a 
more fine-grained division of labor (Arora et al. 2001; Cassiman and Veugelers 2006; Sobrero and 
Roberts 2001). In other words, some organizational decisions related to R&D activities become “make” 
or “buy” decisions. Extant literature has focused on the extent to which external R&D is complementary 
to internal R&D (Cassiman and Veugelers 2006) and on the propensity to license technologies (Arora and 
Ceccagnoli 2006) and has provided extremely valuable insights to understand this process. Research, 
however, has not yet examined important contingencies that allow firms to outsource stages of the R&D 
process. One such contingency is the “knowledge characteristics” of the region where firms are located.  
There is ample evidence to suggest that knowledge flows are geographically bound as they tend to 
stream through social networks (e.g., Almeida and Kogut 1999; Gambardella and Giarratana 2007; 
Powell and Owen-Smith 2004; Sorenson 2003; Tallman et al. 2004). We follow Romanelli and Khessina 
(2005) and assume that “within regional boundaries, frequent interaction promotes the exchange of 
information of situations and events that participants in the exchange commonly experience” (p. 347). 
The central argument of this paper is that social capital can be considered a geographically bound public 
good that reduces both search costs between firms and between firms and other organizations and 
transaction costs involving decision and verification costs, thereby easing learning opportunities for 
innovation. The paper draws on social capital and transaction cost theory in examining the importance of 
regional social capital for firms’ innovative capabilities to introduce process and product innovations, and 
explains how social capital moderates the effectiveness of externally acquired R&D for innovations. 
A contentious issue is how to conceptualize and measure social capital. In the existing literature, 
social capital is often seen as a multidimensional entity encompassing the existing stock of social 
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relationships in a society in the form of networks and other social relationships, shared norms and 
understandings. More specifically, here we follow Coleman in seeing social capital as an entity that “… is 
defined by its function. It is not a single entity, but a variety of different entities, with two elements in 
common: they all consist in some aspect of social structures, and they facilitate certain actions of actors 
within the structure” (Coleman 1988: 98). However, while Coleman and other social capital theorists have 
emphasized the role of intra community ties, Burt (1992) accentuated the (favorable) absence of strong 
ties, since in his view, dense networks transmit redundant information, while weaker ties can be sources 
of new resources and knowledge. Here, we follow Woolcock and Narayan (2000: 231) in advancing the 
claim that the logical conclusion of this debate is that “both strong intra community ties and weak extra 
community networks are needed to avoid making tautological claims regarding the efficacy of social 
capital.” In other words, our concept of regionally bound social capital contains both “closure” as well as 
“bridging” network ties. The problem with empirical research on social capital is, however, the lack of a 
clear distinction between sources and consequences of social capital (Portes and Landolt 1996). In this 
regard, Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) and Lindenberg (1996) are helpful in distinguishing between the 
structural and relational dimensions of social capital. The structural dimension refers to informal social 
interactions amongst individuals that generate cooperation and coordination and reduce opportunistic 
behaviors. The relational dimension refers to the assets rooted in those relationships (e.g. trust and 
trustworthiness). We consider the structural dimension to be the most suitable for empirical analysis 
because it focuses on the sources of social capital as distinct from its consequences.  
Empirically, we exploit within-country regional variation to investigate the effects of social capital on 
innovation. We use Italy as our reference point since that setting is an interesting “test-case”, as Italian 
regions are very different in terms of the availability of social capital. Italy has historically been central in 
the social capital debate as it has constituted the empirical focus of prominent sociologists studying the 
effect of social capital (Banfield 1958; Putnam et al. 1993). We combine data on social capital at the level 
of 21 regions with a large-scale data set on innovative activities in a representative sample of 2464 Italian 
manufacturing firms to analyze the effect of social capital on both product and process innovation, as the 
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implications of social capital may differ according to the type of innovation. Following Schumpeter 
(1912/1934), we define product innovation as new combinations of knowledge being exploited to produce 
commercially viable goods. Following Tushman and Nadler (1986: 76), we understand process 
innovation as “a change in the way products are made or delivered” with the aim of achieving lower costs 
and/or higher product quality. 
We find that being located in regions characterized by a high level of social interaction leads to a 
higher propensity to innovate. This result holds after controlling for a large set of firm and regional 
characteristics. We find, however, that political participation — another important dimension of social 
capital — does not affect innovation. In addition, we find that social capital represents an external 
contingency that positively affects external sourcing of R&D; that is, being located in an area 
characterized by a high degree of social interaction positively moderates the effectiveness of externally 
acquired R&D on innovation. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we illustrate and discuss existing literature on social 
capital and its main implications for economic outcomes. Section 3 presents the hypotheses. Sections 4 
and 5 present the data and the measures of social capital, respectively. In Section 6, we explain the 
method and the results of the empirical analysis. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
2. Empirical and theoretical background 
Research has focused on the role of social capital in different empirical contexts, ranging from individuals 
and small groups (e.g., Moran 2005) to larger organizations and inter-firm alliances (e.g., Gulati 1995; 
Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998; Tsai and Ghoshal 1998), through cities (e.g., Jacobs 1961) and regions (e.g., 
Beugelsdijk and van Schaik 2005; Cooke et al. 2005; Maskell 2000; e.g., Putnam et al. 1993) to entire 
nations (e.g., Knack and Keefer 1997; Zak and Knack 2001). This paper focuses on regional social 
capital.  
The importance of social variables to explain economic outcomes has a long tradition. Long ago, 
Banfield (1958) argued that Southern Italy’s economic backwardness was due to the lack of social capital. 
Later, Putnam et al. (1993) found that the performance of Italian social and political institutions was 
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strongly influenced by citizens’ engagement in community affairs, i.e. by social capital. Putnam et al. 
(1993) viewed memberships of horizontal associations as fundamental for the cooperation and 
communication among their members and also saw them as a source of generalized trust and social ties, 
conducive to economic performance and governmental efficiency. After Putnam et al.’s (1993) study, 
research on the relationship between social capital and economic outcomes flourished (Nahapiet and 
Ghoshal 1998). 
Empirically, Knack and Keefer (1997) conducted a cross-country analysis and showed that trust and 
civic norms have been related to economic performance in 29 market economies over the last twenty-year 
period. Recently, Guiso et al. (2004) studied the importance of social capital on financial development 
and showed that in Italian regions with higher levels of social capital, householders are more likely to use 
checks, invest more in stocks, and have higher access to informal credit. Beugelsdijk and van Schaik 
(2005) found that social capital correlates with high levels of economic growth for a sample of 54 
European regions. Although research on the relationship between social capital and economic outcomes 
has flourished, studies relating social capital to firm-level innovation are still scant. One notable exception 
is Landry et al.’s (2002) study. They provide evidence that diverse forms of firm-level social capital — 
understood as participation and relational assets — contribute more than any other explanatory variable to 
increase the likelihood of introducing an innovation. However, while the focal point of that study is that 
of a region in Canada, the social capital measures are those perceived by firms, not measures directly 
linked to the regional milieu.  
Hypothesis 
Regional social capital and innovation  
The role of networks, communities, and interdependence has come to the forefront in investigations of 
firms’ innovative activities. The early Schumpeterian idea of the solitary entrepreneur bringing about 
innovations has been overtaken by a representation involving different actors working together in iterative 
learning processes of trial and error (Freeman and Soete 1997; Pavitt 2005; Rosenberg 1982; Schumpeter 
1942/87; von Hippel 1988; Walker et al. 1997). Innovation increasingly requires the simultaneous use of 
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a variety skills and knowledge, and these skills and knowledge may not be found within the boundaries of 
the firm (Rosenberg 1982). Accordingly, innovators seldom innovate alone. These newer 
conceptualizations of innovation highlight that interactive learning is central to the innovation process, 
suggesting that innovators rely on formal and informal knowledge trading with a range of institutions and 
actors within an innovation system that includes lead users, suppliers, universities (Brown and Eisenhardt 
1995; Lundvall 1992; Szulanski 1996; von Hippel 1988), and also competitors (Arora et al. 2001; von 
Hippel 1987). Recently, Chesbrough (2003) labeled this distributed nature of the innovation process as 
“open innovation”. 
The general hypothesis developed in this paper is that high levels of social capital in the home region 
may help generate firms’ competitive advantages since social capital favors information and knowledge 
exchange for innovation. The information benefits central to the first stage of the search process for 
innovative solutions consist of access, the opportunity to obtain a valuable piece of information; of 
timing, the opportunity to be informed early; and of referrals, having your name mentioned at the right 
time in the right place (Burt 1992). Following Granovetter (1973), Burt (1992) argued that the strength of 
weak ties stems from the opportunity that these ties may offer to bridge otherwise disconnected groups of 
actors. These connections may lead to non-local or boundary spanning search, which has been considered 
a necessary requirement for successful innovations (Fleming and Sorenson 2001; Rosenkopf and Nerkar 
2001). Localized social networks may ease the process of such external knowledge search through a 
richer set of communication channels (Sorenson 2003).  
Innovation can be defined in terms of new combinations of existing knowledge (Fleming and 
Sorenson 2001; Kogut and Zander 1992; Schumpeter 1912/1934). Accordingly, since variety of 
knowledge is key to the process of generating new combinations (Metcalfe 1994), in a second phase, 
external search helps organizations plug into external sources of variety (often through collaboration), 
allowing them to create innovations based on new combinations of technologies and knowledge (Laursen 
and Salter 2006). However, since innovation projects involving external parties are beset with information 
asymmetries, potential moral hazard problems must also be taken into consideration (Pisano 1990; 
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Williamson 1979). Regional social capital may reduce transaction costs involved in open innovation 
projects, including decision and verification costs (Maskell 2000). Since firms invest in verifying the 
truthfulness of the claims made by external actors (Zak and Knack 2001), high levels of social capital 
make the situation more transparent for the decision maker and decision making easier and less costly. As 
a consequence, resources otherwise spent on verification may be invested in other economic activities, 
including innovative ones. Social capital reduces such verification costs through the reduction of 
information asymmetries and based on the establishment of trust-based relationships, since trust is 
facilitated by repeated social contacts (Gulati 1995) implied by high levels of social capital. In sum, we 
hypothesize:  
H1:  Firms located in regions characterized by high levels of social capital are more likely to 
introduce product and process innovations. 
Social capital and external R&D 
Outsourcing of R&D enables firms to tap into specialized sources of knowledge and capabilities (e.g., 
Dyer and Ouchi 1993; Leiblein et al. 2002; Mowery et al. 1996; Sobrero and Roberts 2001). External 
sourcing of R&D may be affected by regional social capital, a contingency that may influence the 
effectiveness of the externally acquired R&D in producing innovations. R&D projects involve asset-
specific investments and are complex, and as a consequence, related contracts are hard to define ex ante 
(Arora et al. 2001), so the risk of hold-up is eminent (Oxley 1997; Pisano 1990; Williamson 1979, 1985). 
However, social capital may work as an institutional “reparation mechanism” of the implied market 
failure, facilitating a solution to the transaction cost problems. Search, decision, and verification costs will 
be lower with high levels of regional social capital when taking make and buy decisions with respect to 
external R&D acquisitions. Successful outsourcing may also require related outsourcing experience, 
involving processes of trial and error. Operating in a geographical region with a high level of social 
capital may provide better opportunities for learning how to deal effectively with the management of 
outsourcing of R&D activities, since such an environment is conducive to working with external actors, 
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and therefore, prior related experience is much more likely to have been accumulated. These arguments 
lead us to state the following hypothesis: 
H2:  The effect of externally acquired R&D on the likelihood of introducing product and process 
innovation is greater for firms operating in regions associated with high levels of social capital 
Social capital and product and process innovation 
Product innovation involves the creation of technologically new products, whereas process innovation 
involves new elements introduced into an organization’s production or service activities in terms of task 
specifications, work and information flow input factors, and machinery used to manufacture a product or 
deliver a service (Abernathy and Utterback 1975; Freeman and Soete 1997; Rosenberg 1976; Tushman 
and Anderson 1986). Product innovation requires extensive processes of explorative search and 
interaction with many different internal and external sources of knowledge (Brown and Eisenhardt 1995). 
In contrast, process innovation has been described by Tushman and Rosenkopf (1992: 313) as “the most 
primitive form of innovation” and typically requires less search outside the organization. Process 
innovations are often the result of learning-by-using and learning-by-doing, as a consequence of the 
organization’s experience of using new technology (Hatch and Mowery 1998; Rosenberg 1982). 
Accordingly, process innovations are the outcome of managerial decisions about how best to organize the 
firm to optimize the efficiency of its internal procedures and routines. As a result, process innovations are 
often not licensed or sold to other organizations (Arora et al. 2001). Moreover, given the difficulties in 
defining process innovations precisely, secrecy is in general more effective to protect the return from 
process innovation rather than product innovation (Cohen et al. 2000; Levin et al. 1987). Obviously, the 
role of secrecy reduces the scope for external interaction in the innovation process. In sum, these 
arguments lead us to conjecture: 
H3:  Regional social capital increases the likelihood of firms introducing product innovation more 
than process innovation. 
Since product and process innovations are often complementary (Pisano 1996; Reichstein and Salter 
2006) they are frequently introduced simultaneously. In other words, a product innovation may very often 
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require a new process technique in order for it to be technologically and commercially successful. The 
concurrent introduction of the two types of innovation is a complex and costly process, however. Due to 
resource constraints, such complexity may induce firms to rely more on external sources of innovation 
(Arora et al. 2001), making the importance of social capital especially pertinent. Accordingly, we 
hypothesize:  
H4:  Firms operating in regions associated with high levels of social capital will be more likely to 
introduce product and process innovations simultaneously. 
Data description 
This research uses variables referring to two different levels of analysis: firm and region. Consequently, 
the data come from different databases. Regarding the firm level, data on innovation in Italian 
manufacturing firms have been collected by Capitalia (an Italian Bank Group) from a stratified random 
sampling frame of manufacturing firms with more than 10 employees (Capitalia 2006). The survey refers 
to the three-year period 2001-2003 and the sampling plan was created by subdividing the population of 
the assigned firms into layers (strata). The population from which the sample was extracted consists of 
approximately 70,000 firms. The proportion of the sampling frame out of the population is 7 percent in 
terms of the number of firms, and 9 percent in terms of the number of employees. The survey was carried 
out using a questionnaire instrument, through telephone interviews, and obtained a response rate of 28.5 
percent. The sample obtained has been found to be representative of Italian manufacturing firms across 
four macro regions (i.e. northwest, northeast, center, and south), Pavitt’s (1984) sectors (i.e. supplier 
dominated, scale intensive, science based, specialized suppliers) and firm size (11-20, 21-50, 51-250, 
251-500, more than 500 employees) (Capitalia 2006). The actual number of observations, without missing 
values for all our variables, includes 2464 firms.  
With regard to the regional level, the data used to analyze structural social capital have been collected 
by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) through Multi-scope Analyses carried out in 1999. 
The survey was compulsory and was carried out through telephone interviews. The resulting response rate 
was 82.5 per cent. The individual responses have been aggregated by ISTAT to the level of the 21 
 9
regions. To validate the geographical unit of analysis (the 21 regions) against the alternative, the Italian 
provincial level (a total of 100 provinces are located within a region with at least two provinces), we 
conducted a components of variance analysis with random effects (see for instance, McGahan and Porter 
1997) for three variables — that may be related to geographical structural social capital — that we have 
available at the provincial level as well: 1) per capita GDP for 2001; 2) participation rate in the 2001 
referendum on institutional reform; and 3) per capita legal protests for the lack of payment of obligations 
for the year 2001. For these three variables we found that the regional level accounts for between 68 to 77 
percent of the total variance, while the provincial level accounts for between 18 and 26 per cent (the 
residual accounts for between 5 and 6 percent). Accordingly, we believe that the level of the 21 Italian 
regions is the most relevant level of aggregation for our purposes, since variation in social capital levels is 
likely to predominantly between, rather than within, regions. To measure regional expenditure on R&D as 
the percentage of regional GDP, regional human capital and the size of the population, we use data 
obtained from the European Community’s (EC) statistical office, EUROSTAT. The units identified are 
the regions corresponding to the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics level 2 (NUTS 2), the 
classification adopted by the EC.  
We avoid the problem of common method bias to some extent, since our dependent variables are 
collected at the firm level, while some of the key independent variables (in particular those related to 
social capital) are collected at the level of the individual person and aggregated up to the NUTS2 regional 
level. For the firm-specific variables, the questions underlying the outcome variables were placed after the 
questions underlying independent variables on the survey in order to diminish, if not avoid, the effects of 
consistency artifacts (Salancik and Pfeffer 1977). Moreover, we performed Harman's one-factor test on 
the firm-level variables included in the models presented in this paper, to examine whether common 
method bias may augment the relationships detected. Since we found multiple factors, and since the first 
factor did not account for the majority of the variance (the first factor accounts for only 18 percent of the 
variance), potential problems associated with common method bias were not indicated by the test 
(Podsakoff and Organ 1986). 
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The structural social capital measure  
Following the mainstream sociological research on social capital (e.g., Coleman 1988; Portes 1998; 
Putnam et al. 1993) — and as pointed out in the introduction — we focus on the structural dimension of 
social capital. The structural dimension is also considered the most suitable for empirical analysis, 
because it is much easier to measure accurately. To measure structural social capital of the Italian regions, 
we selected a total of 11 regional social capital variables. Table 1 reports on the meaning of each of the 
social capital variables. We consider variables representing friendship and spare-time socialization 
(WEFRI, SOPAR, SAFRI), participation in social associations (CULAS, VOLAS, NVOAS, NUMAS, 
MONAS) and political participation (POPART, MONPA, COMI). In accordance with our adopted concept 
of social capital, the two former types of variables represent coexisting intra community (exclusion) ties 
and weak extra community network (bridging) ties. With respect to the latter set of variables, Scaff (1975) 
underlines that two distinct concepts define political participation; participation as interaction, or 
participation as an instrumental action. The former is closely associated with the idea of cooperation and 
reciprocity to promote communication and the achievement of common interests; the latter refers to 
participation as an instrument to obtain personal advantages, in turn generating competition for resources. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
We run a non-parametric principal component analysis (PCA) on the social capital variables. The 
non-parametric principal component analysis differs from the standard PCA since it deduces eigenvalues 
from a co-graduation matrix (Spearman's rho or rank order correlation coefficients). The aim is to 
minimize the effect of outliers. Appendix Table 1 reports the eigenvalues and the percentage of variance 
explained by the two components. Table 2 displays the two principal components that we extract from the 
analysis. The two components explain more than 80 percent of the total variance. This is considered a 
very satisfactory result for the analysis of social variables. The first factor appears to capture “social 
interaction” and the second factor appears to capture “political participation.” 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
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Econometric analysis  
Measures 
Dependent Variables. The dependent variable in the first logit analysis is a dummy variable, describing 
whether or not firms introduced product innovation, with 1 being product innovative and 0 being non-
product innovative. In a second logit model, the dependent variable is a dummy variable measuring 
whether or not firms are process innovative, with 1 being process innovative and 0 being non-process 
innovative. The two variables are based on the following question: “Over the three year period 2001-
2003, did your firm introduce? a) product innovation; b) process innovation. For product innovation, we 
mean the introduction of at least one new product (or a significantly improved one), and for process 
innovation, we mean the adoption of at least one new process (or a significantly improved one).” Process 
and product innovation were not mutually exclusive on the survey. For the multinomial logit analysis, we 
compare firms realizing neither product nor process innovation (A) to firms which are product innovative 
only (B); process innovative only (C); and to firms both product and process innovative (D). Table 3 
shows the categories and the numbers of observations for each category.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Independent Variables. Two of the key independent variables are the factors representing the 
principal components of social capital at the regional level: social interaction (Social capital I ⎯ social 
interaction) and political participation (Social capital II ⎯ political participation). The final key 
independent variable is a firm-level variable representing external R&D acquisition, which is captured by 
the percentage of externally acquired R&D as a percentage of the firm’s sales. 
Firm specific control variables. Although empirical research indicates that the advantages of size for 
innovativeness are ambiguous, size is commonly used as a variable in firm-level studies of innovation 
(Cohen 1995). On the one hand, larger firms may have higher market power or may be favored by 
economies of scale and scope, and thus they may be able to raise the profitability of innovation strategies; 
on the other hand, smaller firms are more flexible and they have fewer bureaucratic problems, which may 
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increase their innovation process efficiency. We measure firms’ size by the number of employees. 
Further, we control for R&D intensity, measured by the fraction of sales spent on R&D, as well as for 
firms’ age. The percentage of employees with a degree measures the human capital of the firm. The 
principal activities of firms is measured by four dummies (supplier dominated, scale intensive, science 
based, specialized suppliers) representing the Pavitt (1984) sectors. Additionally, since the innovation 
literature has shown attention to user’s needs is important to innovative success (Pavitt 1984; von Hippel 
1988), we use a dummy variable to describe firms’ strategies to use customer satisfaction.  
Regionally specific control variables. The region specific characteristics influencing innovation 
include the  (public and private) regional expenditure on R&D as the percentage of regional GDP, as well 
as the percentage of the workforce with a science and technology degree to measure the regional human 
capital of the region. The population variable is captured by the number of residents in a given region.  
Table 4 gives descriptive statistics and correlations among our variables. The correlations are 
generally low, apart from the correlation (r = 0.47) between regional human capital and social capital I – 
social interaction. However, since the results are robust to dropping any of the two variables, we do not 
appear to have multicollinearity problems. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Regression analysis 
Means of estimation 
Since our dependent variables (product/no product innovation; product/no process innovation) are binary 
variables, we apply a logit model as the means of estimation. As we are also interested in the joint 
introduction of process and product innovation (in particular to asses Hypothesis 4), we also estimate our 
models using a multinomial logit model. However, we have an endogeneity problem, since we must take 
account of the fact that management’s anticipations in relation to performance outcomes as a result of the 
strategy chosen can lead to biased coefficient estimates. This is the case when using a single equation 
logit model, not correcting for endogeneity (Hamilton and Nickerson 2003). These biases may stem from 
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omitted variables related to management’s self-selection, which affects both the choice to make or buy 
R&D and innovation outcome (see, Wooldridge 2002: 50-51).  
It is possible to eliminate the endogeneity bias through an instrumental variables (IV) regression 
approach since the chosen instruments from the first stage model must not be correlated with the 
unobserved variable representing managers’ self-selection in the second stage of the model. As we have a 
dependent variable in the first stage, with a lower and an upper bound (fraction of acquired R&D over 
total sales), the fractional logit regression may be applied (Papke and Wooldridge 1996). In this approach, 
E(y | x) is modeled as a logistic function, where y is the dependent variable and x is a set of regressors: 
E(y | x) = exp(xβ)/[1 + exp(xβ)]. The model ensures that the predicted values of y are in (0, 1) and that the 
effect of any xj on E(y | x) diminishes as xβ → ∞. We use the predicted values from this first stage part of 
the model in lieu of the observed values of external R&D acquisition in the second stage equation.  
Apart from being correlated with the model’s endogenous regressor, the instruments must not bear the 
same problem as the original regressor (Wooldridge 2002: 105). This leaves a problem in finding suitable 
instruments. Here we use four instruments that can be conjectured to condition external R&D acquisition, 
but not the propensity to innovate. These variables measure: 1) whether or not the firm is a member of a 
commercial consortium; 2) whether or not the firm is a member of a corporate group; 3) whether or not 
the firm has previous experience in markets for technology in terms of having acquired patents; and 4) 
average industry-level R&D intensity. The latter is measured for 96 industries, where the industries are 
classified according a mixture of two and three-digit industry codes (aggregated so that at least five firms 
appear in each industry). This variable may reflect the appropriability regime that the given firm is 
operating under (Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Levin et al. 1987; Teece 1986). 
As required, all our instruments in the first-stage regression model correlate (see Appendix Table 2) 
with the variable they instrument for (external R&D acquisition). Since we are using a fractional response 
logit - logit specification, we have no perfect test of the validity of the instruments. The probit model with 
endogenous regressors, however, allows for testing the validity of instruments. Therefore, to understand 
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the validity of the instruments better, we use an instrumental variable probit estimation of our equations, 
although this means of estimation leads to biased coefficients (since in the first stage, the dependent 
variable is assumed to be continuous). The joint null hypothesis is that the group of instruments are valid 
instruments, that is, they are uncorrelated with the error term in the structural equation, and the excluded 
instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. With the four aforementioned 
instruments for external R&D acquisition, the Amemiya-Lee-Newey minimum chi square test statistic is 
2.35, with a corresponding p-value of 0.50 (calculated using the ivprobit and overid modules for Stata) for 
product innovation. In other words, we cannot reject the null hypothesis (we find a similar result for 
process innovation). A Wald test for exogeneity rejects the idea that the acquisition of external R&D is 
exogenous in determining the probability of being a product innovator at the ten percent level, while we 
are able to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity for process innovation at the twenty percent level. 
Hence, since the latter statistic is only weakly consistent with exogeneity, we will treat the acquisition of 
external R&D as endogenous when considering process as well as product innovation.  
Results  
The results of the logit estimations for the second stage of the procedure are reported in Table 5. We find 
support for Hypothesis 1 (“Firms operating in regions associated with high levels of social capital will be 
more likely to introduce product and process innovation”), to the extent that the social interaction 
component of social capital is significant in explaining the likelihood of introducing product and process 
innovation.1 The result for process innovation is significant at the five percent level only. Political 
participation did not provide support for product innovation or for process innovation. This may be due to 
the fact that two distinct concepts define political participation; participation as interaction or 
                                                 
1  We also ran the model while controlling for the regional level of GDP (we do not report these results here for 
reasons of space). Although there are some multicollinearity issues, as regional GDP and structural social capital 
are correlated, the parameters for structural social capital and the interaction effect retain their level, sign and 
significance. The parameter for regional GDP comes out as negative and insignificant. 
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participation as an instrumental action (Scaff 1975). When the latter prevails, political participation 
becomes a tool for achieving personal gain and may generate competition and hamper communication. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Concerning Hypothesis 2 (“The effect of externally acquired R&D on the likelihood of introducing 
product and process innovation is greater for firms operating in regions associated with high levels of 
social capital”) we detect a positive and significant interaction effect between the social interaction 
component of social capital and the proportion of the firm’s R&D that is externally acquired in the case of 
product innovation, but not in the case of process innovation. Due to the non-linear nature of the logit 
model, the marginal effect of an interaction effect is not simply the coefficient for their interaction 
(Hoetker 2007; Norton et al. 2004). In addition, because there are two additive terms, each of which can 
be positive or negative, the interaction effect may have different signs for different values of covariates. 
In order to deal with this complication, we apply a procedure developed by Ai and Norton (2003) that 
computes correct magnitudes and standard errors of the interaction effect for each of the observations 
(this procedure has been implemented in Stata through the inteff module). Figures 1 and 2 provide 
graphical representations of the interaction effect and its significance for product innovation. Figure 1 
illustrates that the strongest interaction effect occurs at medium predicted levels of probability of being 
innovative (approximately between 0.3 and 0.6), whereas the effect is less outspoken for low and high 
levels of predicted probability of being an innovator (the effect is negative in only 7 of 2464 cases). In 
other words, for firms with a low predicted probability of being innovators, the combination of acquiring 
external R&D and being located in a region with a high level of social capital makes little difference. 
Similarly, for firms with a high predicted probability of being innovators; they are likely to innovate 
regardless. Figure 2 illustrates that the interaction effect is positive and significant in the majority of cases 
(97.4 per cent of the observations are significant at the one-tailed five percent level). This result offers 
evidence of the positive role played by social capital on the firm’s acquisition of external knowledge. 
With respect to process innovation, we find that the interaction effect is non-significant. Whereas all 
interaction effects are positive, they are only significant for three observations. In addition, the size effects 
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are very small for all observations (these results are not documented for reasons of space). The interaction 
effects for regional political participation and R&D acquisition are never significant for both product and 
process innovation. In sum, we find partial support for Hypothesis 2. We find support for Hypothesis 3 
(“Regional social capital increases the likelihood of firms introducing product innovation more than 
process innovation”), as the significance of the social interaction component of social capital is higher in 
explaining the likelihood of product innovation in comparison with process innovation.  
[Insert Figures 1 & 2 about here] 
In order to further examine Hypothesis 3, taking into account that firms may introduce product and 
process innovations simultaneously, we apply both multinomial logit and probit analyses as the means of 
estimation to assess the importance of social interactions and political participation for each of the 
innovation types where non-innovative firm (type A) constitutes the benchmark for the three other 
categories of innovation types — product (B); process (C); product and process innovative (D). The 
Hausman test in Appendix Table 3 indicates that we cannot reject the independence of irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA). Two tests are negative, which, according to Long (2006: 245), is a very common result. 
Hausman and McFadden (1984) note this and conclude that a negative result underlines that IIA has not 
been violated. The multinomial probit regressions produced almost identical results (these results are not 
documented for reasons of space) to those of the multinomial logit. Tables 6 reports on the results of the 
multinomial logit regression. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
We visualize the results of the multinomial logit analysis using odds ratio plots in Figure 3. 
According to Long (2006: 262), the odds ratio plots facilitate the interpretation of multinomial logit 
models. The odds ratio plot gives all the information also presented in Table 6. Each row represents an 
independent variable. The plotted letters A-D detail the categories of innovation. The bottom scale 
describes the estimated coefficient βk, m/n, where k is the independent variables, n is the base category 
and m is the category under investigation.  
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
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The top scale indicates the factor change coefficient exp(βk, m/n, δ), with δ being 1 for dummy 
variables k, and std(xk) for continuous variables xk. It gives the change in the odds of the dependent 
variables being m rather than n if xk changes by δ. In addition, the odds ratio plots communicate 
information about significance. A connecting line conveys that the parameter estimates are not 
significantly different at the ten percent level. The vertical spacing of the graph only makes the 
connection lines more visible. Using the plot in Figure 3, based on the multinomial logit model, we find 
further support for Hypothesis 3 since process innovation is affected by structural social capital (social 
interaction) as distinct from no innovation, and the parameter for product innovation is even higher and 
distinct from no innovation and process innovation. However, the results should be interpreted with 
caution, since the differences are only significant at the one-sided ten per cent level.  
We find that the evidence is inconsistent with Hypothesis 4, since although the results show that the 
social interaction component of social capital is significant in explaining the likelihood of introducing 
product and process innovation, there is no difference between the effect of social capital on product 
innovation alone or the simultaneous introduction of product and process innovation. The key difference 
in the effect of social interaction appears to have to do with product innovation as opposed to process 
innovation. In general, it can also be noted that the multinomial logit regressions produce results that are 
consistent with the simple logit estimations.  
Discussion and conclusion 
This paper has illustrated that geographically bound social capital plays an important role in shaping 
firms’ innovative capability across Italian regions. Our research has provided two sets of results. First, we 
found evidence that location matters: firms located in regions characterized by high level of structural 
social capital in terms of social interaction display a higher propensity to innovate. Second, we found 
support for the hypothesis that high levels of the social interaction components of regional structural 
social capital positively moderates the effectiveness of externally acquired R&D on product innovation. 
Social capital therefore, represents an important external contingency that favors the effectiveness of 
external R&D sourcing.  
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The first set of results is consistent with existing literature on the role of geographical contexts for 
firms’ performance — e.g. industrial clusters, industrial districts, and territorial innovation systems 
(Brusco 1982; Lundvall 1992; Porter 1990; Romanelli and Khessina 2005; Tallman et al. 2004). Besides 
economic determinants for firms’ innovative capability and hence competitiveness, our research has 
illustrated that social factors affect firms’ ability to innovative as well. This finding provides empirical 
support to the two main arguments of scholars of social capital. First, social capital refers to the social 
structure of a community and therefore resides in people’s relationships (Coleman 1990; Nahapiet and 
Ghoshal 1998; Portes 1998). Second, since it is co-owned by the parties of a relationship, it facilitates 
individuals’ actions within the social structure (Burt 1992; Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998). Our paper also 
contributes towards a better understanding of the concept of context. The term context — variously 
qualified and utilized, e.g. context-specific — is often “parachuted down” to explain what other 
explanatory variables cannot with regard to firms’ performance. We usually call on context as if it were a 
residual variable. Our attempt to measure structural social capital in terms of social interaction — has 
provided empirical grounding of the social dimensions of a geographical context. Although we 
acknowledge that we have not fully captured all dimensions of geographically bound social capital, we 
submit that social interaction — as measured in our research — constitutes a first step towards a better 
understanding of context. 
Although Napahiet and Ghoshal (1998) argue that social capital affects the conditions at the basis of 
the creation of new knowledge — in their words, intellectual capital, they acknowledge that social capital 
may also affect diffusion and exploitation of existing knowledge. In addition, Napahiet and Ghoshal 
(1998) and Tsai (2000) focus on social capital in intra-firm relationships providing theoretical and 
empirical support for the “organizational advantage” argument (Ghoshal and Moran 1996). As Napahiet 
and Ghoshal (1998) acknowledge, however, their analysis can be extended to other institutional settings 
characterized by enduring relationships, e.g. inter-organizational relationships. These two points lead to 
our second contribution. We have found not only that location in a region with a high level of structural 
social capital is conducive to firms’ innovative abilities, but also that location enhances the probability of 
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externally acquired R&D being translated into product innovations, making the “buy option” more 
attractive to managers. This result positions our paper within a research stream (for instance, Ahuja 2000; 
Baum et al. 2000; Laursen and Salter 2006; for instance, von Hippel 1987) that emphasizes that firms 
may gain access to knowledge and other resources they need by sharing knowledge with the current 
owner, provided that something is given in exchange. Existing literature on markets for innovations and 
technology has not examined the role of geographically bound social capital for the efficiency of 
introducing innovations. Our contribution within this literature is that firms’ environment in terms of 
regional social interaction matters for firms’ innovative capability. This is of course in contrast with 
literature that contends that the only factors that can be the basis of competitive advantage are those that 
cannot be traded on factor markets, and that such factors can only be accumulated internally (e.g., 
Dierickx and Cool 1989).  
In addition, although some of the central contributions to the resource based view have been skeptical 
about the possibility of acquiring sustained competitive advantage based on acquired resources, this paper 
has supported an emerging view arguing that outsourcing of some activities (including parts of R&D) are 
a necessary condition for competitive advantage (Dyer and Ouchi 1993; Leiblein et al. 2002; Sobrero and 
Roberts 2001). In other words, the ability to outsource R&D processes may — as technologies and 
markets change over time — be seen as a firm-level important dynamic capability (Eisenhardt and Martin 
2000). This paper has applied both social capital and transaction cost theory. Whereas there are stark 
differences between these perspectives in a number of respects (Foss 1993; Poppo and Zenger 1998), it is 
worth noting the complementarity between them in this particular case; the theoretical predictions point in 
the same direction, as social capital both increases the ease of interactive learning and decreases 
transaction costs.  
The findings of the study hold implications for managerial practice. Whereas in regions with high 
amounts of social capital, social capital positively affects the effectiveness of externally sourced R&D 
and favors firm innovation; in regions with low levels of social capital, firms need to invest more in their 
own social capital, for instance by promoting meetings, partnerships and communication with other firms 
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and organizations. Firms located in areas with low levels of social capital may also wish to carry out more 
in-house R&D, and should at least be more reluctant to outsource these complex activities. This paper has 
also pointed to the particularly strong organizational constraints involved in introducing process 
innovation: Managers should be less prone to outsource process R&D, given the embeddedness of these 
activities in the overall organizational procedures of the firm. 
There are limitations to this study. In this paper, we have focused on the positive net effects of social 
capital. It should be noted, however, that social capital may have negative consequences as well, when the 
underlying networks have become too tight. Prominent social capital theorists, such as Coleman, have 
stressed the importance of dense networks as a prerequisite for the creation of social capital. However, 
dense networks may carry penalties, involving at least four negative effects: exclusion of outsiders, excess 
claims on group members, restrictions on individual freedoms, and downward leveling norms (see  Portes 
1998: 15 for a detailed discussion of these effects). While our measure of social capital can be considered 
a mixture of strong and weak ties, we share with the rest of the regional literature the inability to 
empirically disentangle these two sets of ties. Although an analysis that would separate these ties would 
be of tremendous value, not least to examine negative sides of social capital in the form of 
“overembeddedness” (Uzzi 1997), such an analysis is extremely difficult to do satisfactorily at a 
relatively high level of aggregation such as the regional level.  
Another limitation of this paper is that we focus on one period only. Although we have controlled for 
a large number of firm- and region-specific factors and have a large sample of firms, the results of this 
study are based on cross-sectional data. A further limitation concerns the fact that although we have relied 
on two data sources, collected at the firm and regional levels, respectively, we do not know whether the 
externally acquired R&D was purchased in the home region. Accordingly, the positive moderation effect 
of the regional social interaction variable on the relationship between externally acquired R&D and 
innovation may have to do with the fact that a high level of regional structural social capital makes the 
acquiring firm better able to learn to deal with the process of outsourcing R&D, and at the same time, 
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likely to be better connected socially to the seller firm located in the home region. Future research should 
collect data on the geographical origin of the acquired R&D to disentangle these two effects.  
Greater emphasis on how geographically bound social capital enables and constrains managerial 
behavior in other parts of the organization appears to be a fertile area for future research. In this paper, we 
focused on the outsourcing of R&D processes ⎯ an increasingly important element in the innovation 
process, but regional social capital may influence the effectiveness of other external relations of the firm, 
including formal collaboration between firms and external parties. Another important issue for future 
research is to separate the effect of social capital and R&D outsourcing on innovation at the level of 
individual industries to explore possible industry variation. New insights from such research can help 
provide guidance for managers when they have to make decisions on how to work together with external 
parties in their environments.  
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Appendix 
 
Appendix Table 1. Results of Principal Component Analysis 
Component Eigenvalue Percentage of variance 
Explained 
Cumulative percent 
1 6.56 59.61 59.61 
2 2.44 22.18 81.79 
 
Appendix Table 2. First-step fractional response regressions explaining external R&D acquisition 
 Explanatory variable Coeff.  S.E. 
 Member of a commercial consortium 0.436 *** (0.131) 
 Member of a corporate group 0.390 *** (0.102) 
 Acquired patents 0.536 ** (0.272) 
 Average industry-level R&D intensity 0.153 *** (0.049)
 Constant -2.671 *** (0.079)
 No. of obs  3282  
 Log likelihood -872  
 Chi-square 24 *** 
 ML (Cox-Snell) R2: 0.01  
  McFadden's pseudo R2 0.01  
Notes: One-tailed tests: † p < .10; * p < .05; **  p < .01; *** p < .001. Standard deviations in parenthesis.   
 
Appendix Table 3. Hausman test. 
    Chi2 Df P>chi2 Evidence   
 A -0.499 2 1.000 for H0  
 B 0.652 2 0.722 for H0  
 C 1.464 2 0.481 for H0  
  D 0.655 2 0.721 for H0   
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Table 1. Description of the variables included in the PCA 
 Variable Description  
 
CULAS 
 
People aged 14 upwards who have joined meetings in cultural circles and similar groups at least  
once a year in the 12 months before the interview per 100 people in the same area  
 
VOLAS 
 
People aged 14 upwards who have joined meetings in voluntary associations and similar 
organizations at least once a year in the 12 months before the interview per  100 people  in the 
same area   
 
NVOAS 
 
People aged 14 upwards who have joined meetings in non-voluntary organizations at least once a 
year in the 12 months before the interview per  100 people  in the same area  
 NUMAS Number of voluntary organizations  per 10.000 people  
 
MONAS 
 
People aged 14 upwards who  have given money to an association at least once a year in the 12 
months before the interview per 100 people in  the same area   
 WEFRI People aged 6 upwards meeting friends at least once a week  per 100 people  in the same area  
 
SOPAR 
 
People aged 6 upwards attending bars!, pubs!, and clubs at least once a week in the 12 months 
before the interview per  100 people in the same area.  
 SAFRI People aged 14 upwards who are satisfied with their relationships with friends   
 
POPART 
 
People aged 14 upwards who have carried out unpaid work for a political party in the 12 months 
before the interview,  per 100 people in  the same area   
 
MONPA 
 
People aged 14 upwards who have given money to a political party  at least once a year per  100 
people in the same area   
 
COMI  
 
People aged 14 upwards who have joined a political meeting in the 12 months before the interview,  
per 100 people  in the same area.  
 
Table 2. Matrix of factor loadings. 
 
    
Component1: 
Social interaction 
Component2: 
Political Participation 
 
 CULAS 0.882 0.246  
 VOLAS 0.893 0.149  
 NVOAS 0.940 0.196  
 NUMAS 0.775 0.333  
 MONAS 0.877 0.295  
 WEFRI 0.814 -0.167  
 SOPAR 0.908 -0.010  
 SAFRI 0.873 -0.083  
 COMIZ -0.586 0.729  
 MONPA -0.115 0.897  
 POPAR -0.349 0.866  
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Table 3: Number of innovations in each category 
 No product inn.       Product innovation 
No process inn. (A) 1.201 (B) 572 
Process innovation (C) 624  (D) 830 
 
 
Table 5. Correlation matrix 
Note: ¤ indicates a predicted variable from the first-step fractional response estimation. Correlation coefficients above |0.04| are statistically significant at the 5 
percent level. 
 
   Mean Std. Dev. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.  
 1 Product innovation 0.43 0.49   
 2 Process innovation 0.45 0.50 0.24             
 3 Social capital I — social interaction  0.44 0.75 0.10 0.02            
 4 Social capital II— political participation -0.05 0.85 0.01 -0.02 0.12           
 5 External R&D acquisition ¤ 0.09 0.03 0.17 0.10 0.04 -0.01          
 6 Size 89.57 210.81 0.12 0.14 0.01 -0.03 0.18         
 7 Age  27.43 18.69 0.03 0.07 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.12        
 8 R&D intensity 0.84 2.90 0.23 0.08 0.04 -0.02 0.27 0.06 0.00       
 9 Percentage of employees with a degree 5.25 7.40 0.15 0.09 -0.05 -0.03 0.25 0.09 0.00 0.23      
 10 Customer Satisfaction 0.71 0.45 0.08 0.10 -0.03 -0.02 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.09     
 11 Regional Human Capital 6.28 1.77 0.05 -0.03 0.46 0.22 0.03 0.00 0.08 0.05 0.01 -0.01    
 
12 
Regional expenditure on innovation (% of 
regional GDP) 0.98 0.36 0.02 0.03 -0.04 -0.35 0.03 0.06 0.11 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.36   
 13 Population (in millions of people) 4.91 2.67 0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.21 -0.02 -0.01 0.14 0.02 -0.02 0.05 0.32 0.39  
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Table 6. Results of the logit regressions for product innovation and process innovation using instrumental variables (n=2464). 
 Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
 Product innovation Process innovation Product innovation Process innovation 
 Coeff.  S.E. Coeff.  S.E. Coeff.  S.E.  Coeff.  S.E.
Social capital I — social interaction  0.189 ** (0.071) 0.122 * (0.066) 0.216 ** (0.072)  0.127 * (0.066)
Social capital II — political participation 0.020  (0.065) 0.057 (0.061) 0.037  (0.065)  0.061  (0.061)
External R&D acquisition ¤ 3.991 * (2.019) 3.132 † (1.890) 3.834 * (2.058)  3.112 † (1.894)
Social interaction × External R&D 
acquisition ¤   8.787 *** (2.708)  2.176  (2.340)
Size 0.001 *** (0.000) 0.003 *** (0.000) 0.001 *** (0.000)  0.003 *** (0.000)
Age  0.002  (0.002) 0.005 * (0.002) 0.002  (0.002)  0.005 * (0.002)
R&D intensity 0.541 ** (0.052) 0.039 * (0.020) 0.543 *** (0.052)  0.038 * (0.020)
% of employees with a degree 0.019 ** (0.007) 0.013 * (0.006) 0.020 ** (0.007)  0.012 * (0.006)
Customer Satisfaction 0.213 * (0.099) 0.334 *** (0.093) 0.220 * (0.099)  0.335 *** (0.093)
Supplier dominated -0.475 *** (0.110) -0.024 (0.106) -0.454 *** (0.111)  -0.018  (0.106)
Scale intensive   -0.551 *** (0.141) 0.215 † (0.133) -0.533 *** (0.142)  0.220 * (0.134)
Science based -0.454 † (0.271) 0.019 (0.235) -0.352  (0.275)  0.041  (0.236)
Specialized suppliers Benchmark Benchmark Benchmark  Benchmark 
Regional Human Capital -0.017 (0.034) -0.085 ** (0.033) -0.016  (0.034)  -0.085 ** (0.033)
Regional Expenditure on innovation (% 
of regional GDP) -0.170 (0.172) 0.290 † (0.160) -0.129  (0.173)  0.302 * (0.161)
Population   0.011 (0.019) -0.020 (0.018) -0.071  (0.019)  -2.18  (0.018)
Constant  -0.462 * (0.232) -0.548 * (0.220) -0.510 * (0.233)  -0.560 * (0.221)
Log likelihood -1480 -1629   -1464   -1628  
Chi-square 435 *** 138 ***  413 ***  139 ***
Pseudo R2 0.12 0.04   0.13      0.04   
 
Notes: ¤ indicates a predicted variable from the first-step fractional response estimation. One-tailed tests: † p < .10; * p < .05; **  p < .01; *** p < .001. 
Standard deviations in parenthesis.   
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Table 7. Results of the multinomial logit regressions using instrumental variables (n= 2464). 
  Model V  Model VI  
  
Product vs. no 
innovation 
Process vs. no 
innovation 
Process and process 
vs. no innovation  
Product vs. no 
innovation 
Process vs. no 
innovation 
Process and process 
vs. no innovation  
  Coef.  S.E.  Coef.  S.E.  Coef.  S.E.  Coef.  S.E.  Coef.  S.E.  Coef.  S.E.  
 Social capital I — social interaction 0.249 ** (0.102)  0.129 † (0.087)  0.231 ** (0.091)  0.285 ** (0.104)  0.144 † (0.089)  0.260 ** (0.092)  
 
Social capital II — political 
participation 0.071  (0.090)  0.096  (0.082)  0.059  (0.083)  0.082  (0.091)  0.094
 
 (0.082)  0.079
 
 (0.083)  
 External R&D acquisition ¤ 3.755 † (2.843)  2.558  (2.740)  5.592 * (2.564)  3.829 † (2.899)  2.619  (2.787)  5.346 * (2.619)  
 
Social interaction × External R&D 
acquisition ¤             7.234 ** (3.745)  0.530  (3.187)  10.155 ** (3.403)  
 Size 0.002 ** (0.001)  0.003 *** (0.001)  0.004 *** (0.001)  0.002 ** (0.001)  0.003 *** (0.001)  0.004 *** (0.001)  
 Age  0.004  (0.004)  0.008 ** (0.003)  0.006 * (0.003)  0.004  (0.004)  0.008 ** (0.003)  0.005 * (0.003)  
 R&D intensity 0.731 *** (0.075)  0.366 *** (0.086)  0.723 *** (0.075)  0.731 *** (0.075)  0.366 *** (0.086)  0.723 *** (0.075)  
 % of employees with a degree 0.016 † (0.010)  0.006  (0.010)  0.025 ** (0.009)  0.016 * (0.010)  0.005  (0.009)  0.025 ** (0.008)  
 Customer Satisfaction 0.219 † (0.135)  0.369 ** (0.126)  0.432 *** (0.127)  0.226 * (0.135)  0.371 ** (0.126)  0.441 *** (0.127)  
 Supplier dominated -0.477 ** (0.151)  0.144  (0.155)  -0.374 ** (0.141)  -0.461 ** (0.151)  0.140  (0.157)  -0.352 ** (0.141)  
 Scale intensive   -0.702 *** (0.209)  0.379 * (0.186)  -0.209  (0.177)  -0.686 *** (0.209)  0.337 * (0.186)  -0.192  (0.177)  
 Science based -0.219  (0.363)  0.361  (0.368)  -0.286  (0.346)  -0.157  (0.366)  0.371  (0.371)  -0.178  (0.348)  
 Specialized suppliers Benchmark  Benchmark  Benchmark  Benchmark  Benchmark  Benchmark  
 Regional Human Capital -0.053  (0.049)  -0.132 **  (0.045)  -0.079 * (0.044)  -0.053  (0.049)  -0.132 ** (0.045)  -0.079 * (0.044)  
 
Regional Expenditure on 
innovation (% of regional GDP) -0.321 † (0.242)  0.233  (0.220)  0.087  (0.217)  -0.295  (0.243)  0.229  (0.222)  0.137  (0.219)  
 Population  0.006  (0.027)  -0.028  (0.025)  -0.007  (0.025)  .004  (0.027)  -0.027  (-0.025  -0.012  (0.025)  
 Constant  -0.590 * (0.326)  -0.828 ** (0.303)  -0.933 ** (0.299)  -0.616 † (0.327)  -0.818 ** (0.303)  -0.992 *** (0.301)  
 Log likelihood -3040            -3034            
 Chi-square 532 ***           543 ***           
 Pseudo R2 0.080            0.082            
 
Notes: ¤ indicates a predicted variable from the first-step fractional response estimation. One-tailed tests: † p < .10; * p < .05; **  p < .01; *** p < .001. Standard 
deviations in parenthesis.  
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 Figure 2. Odds ratio plot of the multinomial regression model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The size effect of the interaction between social interaction and external R&D 
acquisition¤ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. The significance of the interaction between social interaction and external R&D 
acquisition¤ 
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